Matthew Hale v Committee on Character & Fitness

Glenn’s Court Filing as attorney for Matthew Hale, a Nazi denied a law license.

Even in 2001, Glenn’s stated his case in unusually strong terms — to put it generously — as is clear just from Paragraph 1.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MATTHEW F. HALE, :

Plaintiff, : Case No. ______

v.

COMMITTEE ON CHARACTER AND FITNESS FOR
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS; BOARD OF ADMISSIONS
TO THE BAR; COMMITTEE ON CHARACTER AND
FITNESS, STATE OF ILLINOIS, THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT; GORDON L. LUSTFELDT; THOMAS
DUNN; CLARK ERICKSON; CHARLES MARSHALL;
L. LEE PERRINGTON and THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS,

COMPLAINT

Now comes Plaintiff Matthew F. Hale, by and through his attorneys, and alleges as and for his complaint against defendants, alternatively and/or conjunctively, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The denial of Matthew Hale’s application to practice law in the State of Illinois embodies the most egregious – and most dangerous – constitutional abuses which have, again and again, been resoundingly declared by courts in this Nation to be patently unlawful. In sum, Hale, a well-known and vigorous advocate of racist and anti-Semitic ideas, was barred from the legal profession and denied his livelihood because the individuals sitting on the Committee of Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois happened to disagree – strongly – with Hale’s political and religious views. To describe the denial of Hale’s application to practice law, then, is to illustrate the profound dangers it poses to the most basic and valued liberties guaranteed to all citizens by the United States Constitution.

2. Matthew Hale graduated from law school and passed the Bar Examination of the State of Illinois. Despite these achievements, Hale, on June 30, 1999, was denied a license to practice law by the Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, by the Board of Admissions to the Bar, and by its individual members – not because of any misconduct in which he engaged, but rather, because the political and religious views espoused by Hale, and his practice of privately discriminating on the basis of race and religion, led the defendants to conclude that Hale lacked the requisite “character and fitness” to practice law. The Committee’s denial of Hale’s application based on these grounds wilfully and recklessly violated the rights of freedom of statement, freedom of association, due process of law, and equal protection under the law which are guaranteed to all citizens of this Nation, including Hale, by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants’ conduct therefore violated Hale’s rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

3. Independent of the denial of Hale’s specific application, both the substance and procedure of the Rules governing the admissions process are plainly unconstitutional on their face. Specifically, those Rules:

   • bar an applicant from receiving a law license who, in his/her private life, racially discriminates – a clear violation of the First Amendment’s freedom of association;

   • bar an applicant who advocates racial discrimination from practicing law – a clear violation of the First Amendment guarantee of free statement;

   • permit an applicant to be denied a license to practice law without providing the applicant an opportunity to have constitutional challenges to that denial be actually heard or adjudicated by a court that has jurisdiction to do so – a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.

4. But for the patent constitutional abuses of the Committee on Character and Fitness and its individual members, Matthew Hale would be practicing law in Illinois today. Independently, but for the facially unconstitutional procedural and substantive rules governing the admissions process, Hale would be practicing law in Illinois today. The members of the Committee on Character and Fitness, acting under color of law, knowingly and/or recklessly violated Matthew Hale’s constitutional rights to free statement, free association, due process of law, and equal protection. Hale is thus entitled to compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the declaratory and injunctive relief sought herein.

THE PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Matthew F. Hale is a resident of the State of Illinois who, at all relevant times herein, resided in East Peoria, Illinois. In 1998, Hale graduated Southern Illinois University at Carbondale School of Law with a Juris Doctor degree, and thereafter sat for and passed the State of Illinois’ Bar examination conducted in the summer of 1998. Despite his law school degree and successful Bar examination, Hale was denied a licence to practice law in Illinois by the Board of Admissions, the Committee of Character and Fitness, and its individual members, on June 30, 1999, when they purportedly concluded that Hale did not possess the requisite character and fitness to practice law in the State of Illinois.

6. Defendant Committee on Character and Fitness of the State of Illinois is a committee appointed pursuant to Rule 708 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, and operates pursuant to Rule 4 of the Illinois Rules of Procedure for the Board of Admissions and Committee on Character and Fitness. Pursuant to these Rules, the Committee determines whether an applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to the practice of law. Upon the Committee’s certification that the applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness, the Board of Admissions to the Bar, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 708, will admit the applicant to practice law in Illinois. Absent the Committee’s certification, the Board of Admissions to the Bar, pursuant to Rule 708, will deny the applicant the right to practice law in Illinois.

7. Defendant Board of Admissions to the Bar is a panel which, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 702, oversees the administration of all aspects of the bar admissions process, including the assessment of each candidate’s character and fitness to practice law in Illinois. The Board of Admissions administratively implements the Committee’s decision regarding whether an applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness to practice law in Illinois.

8. Defendant Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Third Judicial District, is a committee appointed pursuant to Rule 708 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, and operates pursuant to Rule 4 of the Illinois Rules of Procedure for the Board of Admissions and the Character and Fitness Committee. Pursuant to these Rules, the Committee determines whether applicants within the Third Judicial District possess the requisite character and fitness for admission to the practice of law. Upon the Committee’s certification that the applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness, the Board of Admissions to the Bar, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 708, will admit the applicant to practice law in Illinois. Absent the Committee’s certification, the Board of Admissions to the Bar, pursuant to Rule 708, will deny the applicant the right to practice to practice law in Illinois.

9. Defendant Gordon L. Lustfeldt is an individual who, at all relevant times herein, was a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness and was a commissioner on the Hearing Panel that presided over, and denied, plaintiff’s application to practice law in Illinois.

10. Defendant Thomas Dunn is an individual who, at all relevant times herein, was a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness and was a commissioner on the Hearing Panel that presided over, and denied, plaintiff’s application to practice law in Illinois. Dunn was and is a resident of this District.

11. Defendant Clark Erickson is an individual who, at all relevant times herein, was a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness and was a commissioner on the Hearing Panel that presided over, and denied, plaintiff’s application to practice law in Illinois.

12. Defendant Charles Marshall is an individual who, at all relevant times herein, was a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness and was a commissioner on the Hearing Panel that presided over, and denied, plaintiff’s application to practice law in Illinois.

13. Defendant L. Lee Perrington is an individual who, at all relevant times herein, was a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness and was a commissioner on the Hearing Panel that presided over, and denied, plaintiff’s application to practice law in Illinois.

14. Defendant Supreme Court of Illinois, acting in its administrative capacity, promulgates rules governing all aspects of admission to practice law in the State of Illinois. As such, it created the rules, procedures and guidelines used by the Committee on Character and Fitness and Board of Admissions to the Bar to determine the character and fitness of all applicants, including Hale, to practice law in the State of Illinois.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. ** 1331 and 1343(a) (3) and (a) (4), as this action seeks redress pursuant to a law of the United States, and for violations of plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights.

16. Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. ** 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

17. Plaintiff further invokes this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. * 1367(a), over any and all state constitutional and state law claims that are so related to the claims within the original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the same case or controversy.

18. One or more defendants resides in this District, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to these claims occurred in this District. Venue is therefore proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. * 1391(b).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19. Plaintiff Hale is a graduate of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale School of Law. Hale graduated in 1998 with a J.D. degree. Hale then took and passed the Illinois State Bar Examination and, having completed all requirements for admission to practice law in Illinois, applied for admission in the Summer of 1998. There were no incidents of misconduct in Hale’s past to justify denial of Hale’s application to practice law.

20. The Committee on Character and Fitness and the Board of Admissions denied Hale’s application on the ground that the political and religious views he holds are so disagreeable that those views, by themselves, render him unfit to practice law. As the Committee, in denying his application, reasoned: “Mr. Hale’s long standing and strongly held beliefs are in absolute contradiction to the letter and spirit” of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In light of these views, the Committee predicted that, as a result of the political and religious beliefs he espouses, he “will quickly run afoul” – in the future – of the rules governing attorney conduct.

21. The denial of Hale’s application to practice law based on the grounds that his political and religious beliefs render him unfit violates numerous core constitutional rights. The constitutional rights which defendants’ conduct so plainly violates are among the most clearly established and long standing constitutional liberties – liberties which lie at the heart of this Nation’s democracy. The violation of Hale’s rights by defendants was wilful and reckless, and therefore violative of 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

Background of Hale’s application to practice law

22. Hale is, and since 1996 has been, the “Pontifex Maximus,” or Supreme Leader, of The World Church of the Creator (“WCOTC”), an avowedly racist and anti-Semitic church which espouses White Separatist views. As part of his leadership of the WCOTC, Hale has become a well-known advocate of racism and anti-Semitism, and has written numerous articles, given countless speeches, and regularly appeared on television shows and in the written media advocating and disseminating his and the WCOTC’s racist and anti-Semitic ideas.

23. Hale does not conceal or dilute his views. As part of the application process to become authorized to practice law in Illinois, he candidly acknowledged that he fervently believes in the ideas he advocates and does not intend to abandon them. He further acknowledged that he – like many citizens – stands firmly opposed to many laws and rules, including certain constitutional amendments, which the majority of the population favors.

24. Regardless of these opinions, Hale, from the beginning of the admissions process, repeatedly affirmed his ability and intent to comply with all rules and laws governing the conduct of an attorney, regardless of whether he agreed or disagreed with such rules and laws. Moreover, while candidly disclosing his intent, via advocacy and persuasion, to bring about the repeal of laws with which he disagrees, he unequivocally committed to abide by all laws and rules as written and/or as courts interpreted and applied them.

25. Hale’s commitment to adhere to all applicable laws and rules in the future was bolstered by his past. Unlike many applicants who are admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois despite a history of criminal behavior, Hale has no criminal record. Indeed, as the Inquiry Panel of the Committee on Character and Fitness found, Hale demonstrated “an absence of criminal conduct . . . by clear and convincing evidence.”

The Inquiry Panel’s Recommendation

26. Pursuant to Rule 5.1(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Admissions and the Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois (the “Rules of Procedure”), Hale’s application was, in the first instance, referred to a single member of the Third District Committee for consideration. After reviewing the application, that member advised the Illinois Board of Admissions that he was not prepared to recommend that Hale be admitted to practice law in Illinois.

27. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 5.2(a) of the Rules of Procedure, the Chairperson of the Third District Committee assigned Hale’s application to a three-person “Inquiry Panel” for further review, examination, and ultimately, the issuance of a recommendation to the Committee as to whether or not Hale was fit to practice law.

28. On December 16, 1998, in a 2-1 written Decision, the Inquiry Panel recommended that the Committee withhold Hale’s admission to practice law in Illinois. The Inquiry Panel candidly admitted that “the reasons for [its] decision relate to the applicant’s active advocacy of his core beliefs.”

29. Indeed, the Inquiry Panel, in refusing to recommend Hale for admission to practice law, expressly acknowledged that: “The easiest resolution of Mr. Hale’s application is to certify him. This would be in accord with the view that the First Amendment is virtually absolute.” Despite its apparent recognition that unwavering application of the First Amendment would compel Hale’s admission to practice law, the Inquiry Panel – after lengthy philosophical discussions regarding why the majority of the Inquiry Panel believe Hale’s political and religious views to be misguided and “irrational” – concluded that, by virtue of these views, Hale was not fit to practice law.

30. Appallingly and unconstitutionally – but also revealingly – the Inquiry Panel outright admitted that its recommendation to deny Hale’s application was based on its belief that it was entitled to place its “preference for antidiscriminatory values over the First Amendment.” Indeed, the Inquiry Panel went so far as to admit that while Hale was “free” to “incite as much racial hatred as he desires . . . he cannot do this as an officer of the court.” The Inquiry Panel further explained its recommendation not to certify Hale by expressing its opposition to Hale’s purported desire to submit “fundamental rights” to majority vote, and by condemning Hale’s admiration for Adolph Hitler.

31. The Inquiry Panel concluded its recommendation by excerpting a passage from the historian William L. Shirer relating to the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany, and then reasoned that – while “merely holding private theoretical beliefs favoring either [destruction of the Bill of Rights or overthrow of the government] is not a legal basis for disqualifying a bar applicant” – Hale does not merely believe, but also actively advocates such views. As a result of his advocacy of these views, the Inquiry Panel recommended that Hale should not be admitted to practice law in Illinois.

32. That the Inquiry Panel’s recommendation is replete with expressions of the political beliefs of the majority of its members, and that it is comprised almost exclusively of a refutation of Hale’s political views, reveals the profoundly unconstitutional and tyrannical impulses underlying its recommendation. Indeed, the Inquiry Panel unabashedly acknowledged that it was recommending Hale’s denial to practice law not because of any conduct in which he had engaged, but rather, because Hale’s views were so disagreeable to the two individuals who, on that day, happened to comprise a majority of the Inquiry Panel.

The Hearing Panel’s June 30, 1999 rejection of Hale’s application

33. Pursuant to Rule 5.3(a) of the Rules of Procedure, the Inquiry Panel’s recommendation that Hale not be certified resulted in the automatic creation by the Committee of a 5-member “Hearing Panel” to determine with finality whether Hale should be certified for admission to practice law. Certification by the Hearing Panel would presumptively result in Hale’s admission. Refusal to certify Hale would result in the denial of Hale’s admission.

34. The 5-member Hearing Panel, consisting of the 5 individual defendants, convened a hearing on April 10, 1999 in Joliet, Illinois. At that hearing, multiple witnesses testified that Hale possessed the requisite character and fitness to practice law and that he had always displayed a respect even for those laws with which he disagreed.

35. The evidentiary hearing held by the Hearing Panel had very little to do with Hale’s conduct or with his fitness to practice law. To the contrary, the hearing principally focused on Hale’s political and religious beliefs. Indeed, the questions asked by the Committee’s counsel and the Hearing Panel of both Hale and most of his witnesses almost exclusively related to the nuances and intricacies of Hale’s political and religious views.

36. In sum, the April 10, 1999 hearing that was conducted by the Hearing Panel resembled a Spanish Inquisition-like interrogation of a person’s political thoughts, religious convictions, and core beliefs. The vast bulk of the questions were those which would be expected from a tribunal charged with policing a person’s thoughts and beliefs, not a person’s conduct, character and fitness to practice law.

37. Again and again, the Hearing Panel commissioners and the Committee’s counsel demanded to hear Hale’s responses to the political arguments they presented against Hale’s political and religious beliefs. Repeatedly, they questioned Hale and his witnesses as to the underlying premises of the views he espouses and his reasons for believing what he believes, and demanded to know whether he would admit that his views, and the manner in which he expresses them, are “insulting.”

38. At the hearing, defendant Lustfeldt, the Chairman of the Hearing Panel, while denying that the inquiry was confined to Hale’s beliefs and insisting that it instead was focused on his “character,” simultaneously acknowledged that the focus of the Hearing Panel’s assessment of Hale’s “character” was the views and beliefs he espoused. As defendant Lustfeldt put it:

    As far as I’m concerned, this is really not about your beliefs except as they might be indicative of your character and fitness to be a member of the bar . . . . The question is whether you are credible when you say [that you can take the attorney oath], and I think the difficulty from that is that when someone says every day I believe this, I believe this, I believe this and they publicly advocate these positions repeatedly and encourage others to take them up and then for you to come in here today and say well, I know I say that Jews all have to be shipped out of the country and I know I say that blacks are like apes, but I’ll tell you what, I can do this job, and that’s the difficulty, you see, in trying to sort this out, and that’s been the sources of these questions. . . .
    It’s not about your beliefs, it’s about your character and fitness, and one of the windows into somebody’s character is what they will say, along with what they do, and I think that’s the purpose of this as far as I’m concerned. Thus, even at the hearing, the Chairman of the Hearing Panel made perfectly clear that the reason that so much of the hearing was devoted to Hale’s political and religious beliefs, rather than his conduct, was because – in the view of the Hearing Panel – Hale’s political and religious beliefs were, by themselves, sufficient to question Hale’s fitness to practice law, as such views provided a “window” into his character.

39. Consistent with defendant Lustfeldt’s admissions at the hearing, the Hearing Panel decided, on June 30, 1999, to deny Hale’s application for admission to practice law in Illinois. In a 6-page document, the Committee purported to cite 3 reasons for its conclusion:

    • that Hale’s belief in private-sector racial discrimination, and his stated intent to privately discriminate, were inconsistent with the “letter and spirt” of the Rules of Professional Conduct;

    • that Hale’s refusal, at the Committee’s insistence, to “repudiate” a 1995 letter he had written to an advocate of affirmative action – a letter the Committee believed was “insulting and totally inappropriate” – shows a “monumental lack of sound judgement” which will put Hale “on a collision course with the Rules of Professional Conduct”; and,

    • in a one-paragraph, indescribably conclusory assertion placed at the end of its decision, the Committee claimed that Hale “was not open with the panel during the hearing,” but then cited two excerpts in the record to demonstrate this was so which pertained exclusively to Hale’s political views: (i) where Hale did nothing more than refuse to assent to the Committee’s characterization that Hale’s statement of his beliefs in the above-referenced Affirmative Action letter was “inappropriate” and “insulting”; and (ii) where Hale did nothing more than refuse to agree with the Committee’s apparent belief that disseminating literature with swastikas on them outside of a prayer breakfast was inappropriately “insulting.” In short, the Committee disingenuously, and as a pretext, equated Hale’s refusal to swear to the Rightness of the Committee’s views regarding what is and is not “appropriate” statement with a lack of “candor” on Hale’s part.

40. In sum, the Hearing Panel’s denial of Hale’s application to practice law in the State of Illinois was unmistakably, and unabashedly, motivated not by any conduct on Hale’s part, but rather, by: (a) the Committee’s disapproval of Hale’s political and religious views; (b) the Committee’s objections to Hale’s intent to discriminate on the basis of race and religion when forming his private associations; and (c) the Committee’s “prediction” as to what Hale’s future conduct likely would be.

41. In rejecting Hale’s application to practice law, the Committee violated Hale’s most basic and fundamental liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Its denial of Hale’s application based on his political and religious views violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free statement. Its punishment of Hale for his private associational choices violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free association. Its deprivation of Hale’s right to practice law based not on conduct in which he has actually engaged, but rather, based on conduct in which the Committee “predicts” he will engage in the future, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process of law.

42. The grounds invoked by the Hearing Panel to deny Hale’s application were ones which had not been previously raised by the Inquiry Panel. Hale had multiple challenges to the constitutionality of the Committee’s denial which he wished to raise. In order to have these challenges heard and adjudicated, Hale, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 708, petitioned the Supreme Court of Illinois for review of the Committee’s denial. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, refused to hear or adjudicate these constitutional challenges.

43. As a result of the Illinois Supreme Court’s refusal to hear or adjudicate Hale’s constitutional challenges to the Committee’s denial, the Committee’s denial has been unchallenged, and Hale’s constitutional claims have never been heard or adjudicated.

The Rules governing the admissions process

44. Independent of the Committee’s deprivation of Hale’s Constitutional rights, both the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as the Rules of Procedure for the Board of Admissions and Committee on Character and Fitness, are, on their face, unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

45. Initially, despite the profound and serious constitutional challenges to the acts and decisions of the Committee in rejecting his application which Hale wanted to raise, Hale had no opportunity to have those constitutional challenges heard or adjudicated. This was so because the Rules governing the admissions process guarantee that an applicant who is denied admission to practice law in Illinois only has the right to appear before the Committee on Character and Fitness, and not before a court of general jurisdiction which is bestowed with jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.

46. Supreme Court Rule 708 provides that an applicant who is denied admission to practice law does not have any entitlement to have constitutional or other challenges to that denial heard in a court of general jurisdiction authorized to adjudicate such claims. Instead, that Rule provides that it is in the unfettered discretion of the Illinois Supreme Court whether to hear and adjudicate such challenges.

47. Thus, an applicant can be denied admission to practice law in violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights, and be consigned to the Committee on Character and Fitness, a body with very narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction, which is not even authorized to adjudicate the applicant’s constitutional claims.

48. Specifically, Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Admissions to the Bar and the Committee on Character and Fitness expressly enumerates the narrow issues which the Committee is permitted to hear and adjudicate. All such issues are narrow evidentiary issues relating to whether the applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness to practice law in Illinois. Manifestly, the Committee is a body of very limited jurisdiction which does not include jurisdiction to adjudicate an applicant’s constitutional claims.

49. Thus, the admissions process, and the specific rules cited, are unconstitutional on their face, as they provide for the denial of an applicant’s right to practice law in Illinois without providing the applicant with an opportunity to have constitutional and other challenges to that denial heard and adjudicated.

50. Independently, the Rules are also facially unconstitutional because of their substantive provisions. Specifically, Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, and national origin not only in the lawyer’s public and professional life, but also in the lawyer’s private life. Such a prohibition unduly intrudes into a citizen’s free associational choices. The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association prohibits the State from proscribing a citizen’s private associational choices and from punishing a citizen for the exercise of associational choices. As such, Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, on its face, is unconstitutional in violation of this First Amendment right.

51. Similarly, Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from advocating precepts of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. Such a prohibition unduly intrudes into a citizen’s right of free statement. The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of statement prohibits the State from proscribing the views which a citizen is permitted to express and from punishing a citizen for the exercise of free statement. As such, Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, on its face, is unconstitutional in violation of this First Amendment right.

52. Thus, not only did the Committee violate Hale’s fundamental constitutional rights, and not only are the Rules governing admissions unconstitutional on their face, but also, the procedural rules governing the admissions process provided Hale with no opportunity to be heard with regard to these constitutional challenges to the denial of his right to a livelihood and to practice law.

53. As a result of these patent, reckless and wanton violations of his constitutional rights by defendants, Hale, for almost two years, has been denied the right to practice law in Illinois and has therefore been severely injured. Moreover, the facially unconstitutional rules and laws governing the admission process, unless enjoined, are certain to be applied to future applicants, including Hale, in order to deny those applicants fundamental constitutional rights.

As Applied Constitutional Challenges:

COUNT I

Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. * 1983 for Violation
of Plaintiff’s First Amendment Right of Freedom of statement

54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, as if fully set forth herein.

55. Defendants Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Board of Admissions to the Bar, Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Third Judicial District, Gordon L. Lustfeldt, Thomas Dunn, Clark Erickson, Charles Marshall, and L. Lee Perrington acted with recklessness and deliberate indifference to the First Amendment rights of plaintiff. As a direct and proximate result of these acts and omissions, plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of statement, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated by denying him the right to practice law in the State of Illinois, based upon his statement and advocacy of constitutionally protected political and religious views. Specifically, defendants’ rejection of Hale’s application to practice law in Illinois was motivated by their disagreement with his views and their desire to punish him for expressing, advocating and ascribing to those views.

56. Moreover, defendants’ purported conclusion that Hale lacked the requisite character and fitness to practice law was based upon their view that an applicant vigorously advocating racist and anti-Semitic views by definition lacks the requisite character and fitness to practice law.

57. The conduct of the aforementioned defendants in denying plaintiff admission to practice law in Illinois, and thereby depriving him of his right to earn a livelihood, was performed under color of law and was in patent violation of the constitutional rights of free statement guaranteed to plaintiff by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

58. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, these defendants deprived plaintiff of his First and Fourteenth Amendments rights and have thus violated 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

59. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer substantial damages, including loss of income, harm to his career, the denial of a livelihood, and the loss of his constitutional liberties.

60. Moreover, the constitutional rights defendants violated are well-established and long-standing. As a result, defendants’ conduct contravened clearly established constitutional rights which reasonable persons would have known. Thus, the acts of these defendants were intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless and oppressive, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count I and award plaintiff an amount equal to all of the damages he has suffered as a result of these defendants’ actions, attorneys’ fees and costs, and, because these defendants acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for plaintiff’s rights, award punitive damages and other relief as may be appropriate.

COUNT II

Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. * 1983 For Violations
of Plaintiff’s First Amendment Right of Freedom of Association

61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, and 55 through 60, as if fully set forth herein.

62. Defendants Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Board of Admissions to the Bar, Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Third Judicial District, Gordon L. Lustfeldt, Thomas Dunn, Clark Erickson, Charles Marshall, and L. Lee Perrington acted with recklessness and deliberate indifference to the First Amendment rights of plaintiff. As a direct and proximate result of these acts and omissions, plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of association, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated by denying him the right to practice law in the State of Illinois, based upon his belief in discriminating in his private associations on the basis of race and religion, and based on the exercise of his associational freedoms in accordance with those beliefs. Specifically, defendants’ rejection of Hale’s application to practice law in Illinois was motivated by their disagreement with his associational choices and their desire to punish him for exercising his associational freedoms in a discriminatory manner.

63. Moreover, defendants’ purported conclusion that Hale lacked the requisite character and fitness to practice law was based upon their view that an applicant who, in his/her private life, discriminates on the basis of race and religion by definition lacks the requisite character and fitness to practice law.

64. The conduct of the aforementioned defendants in denying plaintiff admission to practice in Illinois, and thereby depriving him of his right to earn a livelihood and practice law, was performed under color of law and was in patent violation of the constitutional rights of free association guaranteed to plaintiff by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

65. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, these defendants deprived plaintiff of his First and Fourteenth Amendments rights and have thus violated 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

66. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer substantial damages, including loss of income, harm to his career, the denial of a livelihood, and the loss of his constitutional liberties.

67. Moreover, the constitutional rights defendants violated are well-established and long-standing. As a result, defendants’ conduct contravened clearly established constitutional rights which reasonable persons would have known. Thus, the acts of these defendants were intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless and oppressive, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count II and award plaintiff an amount equal to all of the damages he has suffered as a result of defendants’ actions, attorneys’ fees and costs, and, because these defendants acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for plaintiff’s rights, award punitive damages and other relief as may be appropriate.

COUNT III

Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. * 1983 For Violations
of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process of Law

68. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, 55 through 60, 62 through 67, as if fully set forth herein.

69. Defendants Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Board of Admissions to the Bar, Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Third Judicial District, Gordon L. Lustfeldt, Thomas Dunn, Clark Erickson, Charles Marshall, and L. Lee Perrington acted with recklessness and deliberate indifference to the Fourteenth Amendment rights of plaintiff. As a direct and proximate result of these acts and omissions, plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated by denying him his right to practice law in the State of Illinois not on the basis of any actual misconduct in which plaintiff actually engaged, but instead, based on the Committee’s prediction that he will, in the future, engage in conduct violative of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

70. These defendants thus punished plaintiff and deprived him of rights not for any conduct in which he actually engaged, or for any acts he actually committed, but instead punished him for acts in which the defendants – based on Hale’s constitutionally protected beliefs – predicted he would engage in the future.

71. The imposition of punishment and/or a deprivation of rights, based on acts in which the State predicts a citizen will engage violates the most basic constitutional guarantees of due process of law.

72. The conduct of these defendants in denying plaintiff admission to practice law in Illinois, and thereby depriving him of his right to earn a livelihood, was performed under color of law and was in patent violation of the constitutional right of due process guaranteed to plaintiff by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

73. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, these defendants deprived plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and have thus violated 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

74. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer substantial damages, including loss of income, harm to his career, the denial of a livelihood, and the loss of his constitutional liberties.

75. Moreover, the constitutional rights defendants violated are well-established and long-standing. As a result, defendants’ conduct contravened clearly established constitutional rights which reasonable persons would have known. Thus, the acts of these defendants were intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless and oppressive, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count III and award plaintiff an amount equal to all of the damages he has suffered as a result of defendants’ actions, attorneys’ fees and costs, and, because these defendants acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for plaintiff’s rights, award punitive damages and other relief as may be appropriate.

COUNT IV

Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. * 1983 For Violations
of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection Under the Law

76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, 55 through 60, 62 through 67, and 69 through 75, as if fully set forth herein.

77. Defendants Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Board of Admissions to the Bar, Committee on Character and Fitness for the State of Illinois, Third Judicial District, Gordon L. Lustfeldt, Thomas Dunn, Clark Erickson, Charles Marshall, and L. Lee Perrington acted with recklessness and deliberate indifference to the Fourteenth Amendment rights of plaintiff. As a direct and proximate result of these acts and omissions, plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law was violated. To the extent that these defendants purported to rely on plaintiff’s alleged misconduct as a basis for denying him his license to practice law in the State of Illinois, they treated plaintiff differently, unequally, and worse as compared to similarly situated applicants to practice law in Illinois. Plaintiff was treated unequally because of his statement and advocacy of constitutionally protected views, and because of his exercise of his constitutionally protected freedom of association.

78. Multiple applicants with extensive histories of serious criminal misconduct or even violence have been admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois. Hale has no such history. To the extent defendants’ denial of Hales’s application was allegedly based on any alleged misconduct, such denial constitutes unequal treatment accorded to Hale as compared to similarly situated applicants, based on, and as a punishment for, the views he advocates and the associations he chooses.

79. The conduct of these defendants in denying plaintiff admission to practice law in Illinois, and thereby depriving him of his right to earn a livelihood, was performed under color of law and was in patent violation of the constitutional right of equal protection under the law, guaranteed to plaintiff by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

80. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, these defendants deprived plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendments right to equal protection under the law and have thus violated 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

81. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer substantial damages, including loss of income, harm to his career, the denial of a livelihood, and the loss of his constitutional liberties.

82. Moreover, the constitutional rights defendants violated are well-established and long-standing. As a result, defendants’ conduct contravened clearly established constitutional rights which reasonable persons would have known. Thus, the acts of these defendants were intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless and oppressive, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count IV and award plaintiff an amount equal to all of the damages he has suffered as a result of defendants’ actions, attorneys’ fees and costs, and, because these defendants acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly and/or with reckless disregard for plaintiff’s rights, award punitive damages and other relief as may be appropriate.

Facial Constitutional Challenges:

COUNT V

Claim for Judgment Declaring Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct Facially Unconstitutional in Violation
of the First Amendment Right to Freedom of Association and for Injunctive Relief

83. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, 55 through 60, 62 through 67, 69 through 75, and 77 through 82, as if fully set forth herein.

84. The Supreme Court of Illinois drafted, codified, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, a statute which is unconstitutional on its face, as it impermissibly infringes upon a bar applicant’s and all attorneys’ First Amendment right to freedom of association.

85. Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct that discriminates against any person on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin, regardless of whether such discrimination is committed in the attorneys’ professional or private life. Thus, this Rule allows that a bar applicant can be denied admission to practice law in Illinois if the applicant discriminates on the basis of such factors even in the applicant’s private, non-professional life.

86. This Rule is therefore unconstitutional because it infringes bar applicants’ and attorneys’ First Amendment right to freedom of association.

87. As a direct and proximate result of this unconstitutional Rule, defendant Supreme Court of the Illinois is depriving attorneys admitted to practice in Illinois and prospective attorneys the right to freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment.

88. Future application of this facially unconstitutional Rule is certain. Moreover, because plaintiff is entitled to re-apply for admission to practice law in Illinois, this facially unconstitutional Rule is almost certain to be again applied adversely to him. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to declaratory judgment declaring Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to be unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment and an injunction permanently enjoining future application of this Rule to the extent it prohibits or punishes the exercise of freedom of association.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count V, declaring Rule 8.4(a)5 to be unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and permanently enjoining future application of this Rule to prohibit or punish the exercise of freedom of association.

COUNT VI

Claim for Judgment Declaring Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois

Rules of Professional Conduct Unconstitutional as Violative of the
First Amendment Right to Freedom of statement and for Injunctive Relief

89. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, 55 through 60, 62 through 67, 69 through 75, 77 through 82, and 84 through 88, as if fully set forth herein.

90. The Supreme Court of Illinois drafted, codified, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, a statute which is unconstitutional on its face, as it impermissibly infringes upon a bar applicant’s and attorneys’ First Amendment right to freedom of statement.

91. Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys from advocating discrimination against any person on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin, regardless of whether such discrimination is committed in the attorneys’ professional or private life. Thus, this Rule allows that a bar applicant can be denied admission to practice law in Illinois if the applicant advocates discrimination on the basis of such factors even in the applicant’s private, non-professional life.

92. This Rule is therefore unconstitutional because it infringes bar applicants’ and attorneys’ First Amendment right to freedom of statement.

93. As a direct and proximate result of this unconstitutional Rule, defendant Supreme Court of the Illinois is depriving attorneys admitted to practice in Illinois and prospective attorneys awaiting admission the rights to freedom of statement guaranteed by the First Amendment, and is thus violative of 42 U.S.C. * 1983.

94. Future application of this facially unconstitutional Rule is certain. Moreover, because plaintiff is entitled to re-apply for admission to practice law in Illinois, this facially unconstitutional Rule is almost certain to be again applied adversely to him. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to declaratory judgment declaring Rule 8.4(a)5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to be unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment and an injunction permanently enjoining future application of this Rule to the extent it prohibits or punishes the exercise of freedom of statement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count VI, declaring Rule 8.4(a)5 to be unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and permanently enjoining future application of this Rule to prohibit or punish the exercise of freedom of statement.

COUNT VII

Claim for Judgment Declaring Illinois Supreme Court Rule 708
and Rule 4 of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure Unconstitutional in Violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment Right To Due Process of Law and for Injunctive Relief

95. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53, 55 through 60, 62 through 67, 69 through 75, 77 through 82, 84 through 88, and 90 through 94, as if fully set forth herein.

96. The Supreme Court of Illinois drafted, codified, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 708 and Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure for Character and Fitness Committees. These Rules, taken together, allow the Committee on Character and Fitness and Board of Admissions to deprive bar applicants of rights, privileges and property while denying those applicants an opportunity to be heard with respect to their claim that such deprivation constitutes a violation of their constitutional rights.

97. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 708 provides that an applicant who is denied admission by the Committee on Character and Fitness does not have a right to have constitutional claims, or any other claims, regarding that denial heard in any court of general jurisdiction, such as the Supreme Court. Instead, Rule 708(d) provides that such an application has the right only “to petition the Supreme Court for review,” a petition which the Supreme Court may, in its unfettered discretion, grant or deny.

98. Thus, an applicant can be denied admission to practice law in violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights, and be consigned to being heard not in a court of general jurisdiction, but instead, only in the Committee on Character and Fitness, a body with very narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction, which is not even authorized to adjudicate the applicant’s constitutional claims.

99. Specifically, Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Admissions to the Bar and the Committee on Character and Fitness expressly enumerates the narrow issues which the Committee is permitted to hear and adjudicate. All such issues are narrow evidentiary issues relating to whether the applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness to practice law in Illinois. Manifestly, the Committee is a body of very limited jurisdiction which does not include jurisdiction to adjudicate an applicant’s constitutional claims.

100. Thus, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 708 and Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure establishes a system whereby an applicant can be denied rights, privileges and property without ever having an opportunity to be heard with regard to claims concerning the unconstitutionality of said denial, and without ever having the applicants’ arguments heard in, or adjudicated by, a court of general jurisdiction.

101. The deprivation of rights, privileges and property without a full opportunity to be heard violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Such deprivation contravenes clear, well-established principles of which reasonable persons would be aware.

102. These rules were the direct and proximate cause of the deprivation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

103. Future application of these facially unconstitutional rules in order to deprive future applicants of due process rights is certain. Moreover, because plaintiff is entitled to re-apply for admission, these facially unconstitutional rules are almost certain to be applied adversely to him again in the future.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment in his favor against Defendants on this Count VII: (a) declaring Supreme Court Rule 708 and Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Admissions and the Committee on Character and Fitness to be unconstitutional on their face in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they allow the denial of admission to practice law without providing an opportunity to have constitutional challenges to said denial actually heard and adjudicated in a court of general jurisdiction authorized to hear and adjudicate such challenges, and (b) permanently enjoining future application of these Rules to deny applicants admission without providing the constitutionally mandated opportunity to be heard.

Dated: June 27, 2001

MATTHEW F. HALE

By ______________

One of his attorneys

Glenn Greenwald

GREENWALD, CHRISTOPH & HOLLAND, P.C.

1370 Avenue of the Americas

32nd Floor

New York, NY 10019

Telephone: (212) 489-6359

Fax: (212) 246-2698

OF COUNSEL PURSUANT

TO LOCAL RULE 83.15:

Jason Gylling

4445 N. Rockwell

Chicago, IL 60625

Telephone: (773) 334-0498

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Matthew F. Hale hereby demands a trial of the above-entitled action by Jury.

MATTHEW F. HALE

By ______________

One of his attorneys

Glenn Greenwald

GREENWALD, CHRISTOPH & HOLLAND, P.C.

1370 Avenue of the Americas
32nd Floor
New York, NY 10019

Telephone: (212) 489-6359
Fax: (212) 246-2698

OF COUNSEL PURSUANT

TO LOCAL RULE 83.15:

Jason Gylling

4445 N. Rockwell
Chicago, IL 60625

Telephone: (773) 334-0498